Every claim on this site comes from a source. This page is that source list — organized by category, with descriptions so you know what you're clicking before you click it. Everything here is publicly available. All of it is independently verifiable. We encourage you to read the originals and draw your own conclusions.
Items marked El Paso are directly relevant to our city's situation.
What has been reported specifically about El Paso's Flock program
The most comprehensive local account of the March 3, 2026 council vote. Covers the agenda item put forward by Reps. Canales and Limón, the police chief's testimony, the final vote, and what it means for the May 16 contract expiration. Essential reading before contacting your council member.
Read at El Paso MattersFirst reported the anomaly on El Paso PD's Flock transparency portal showing a Harris County commissioner's office — not a law enforcement agency — listed as having access to El Paso camera data. Also covers the Texas DPS licensing investigation. Essential local context.
Read at El Paso NewsRep. Lily Limón on the record: "We're not like other cities. I want to hope that because of our city and a community built by immigrants, that we don't have the accessibility through a back door for someone to come in and gather the data." Pre-vote coverage with Canales and Limón explaining their concerns directly.
Read at KVIAPost-vote coverage including Rep. Limón's statement at the meeting: "If you really read the Flock contract, data will not be shared unless required by law. Can we agree on this? That's where the back door can be opened." Direct quotes from the March 3 session.
Read at CBS4Fact brief confirming at least 150 Flock cameras operate across El Paso under the EPPD contract expiring May 16, 2026. Also clarifies the Sheriff's Office does not participate in the Flock network. Useful for understanding the scope of El Paso's specific deployment.
Read at El Paso MattersThe city's own public-facing portal showing usage statistics, data sharing arrangements, and which agencies have access to El Paso's camera data. This is where the Harris County commissioner access was documented. A primary source — read it yourself.
View the portalPre-vote coverage from February 26, 2026. Notes that it is unknown whether the software switch allowing outside agency access to El Paso's stored data is turned on, and whether data has been batch-approved for ICE access. Raises questions that remain unanswered.
Read at El Paso Herald PostPrimary sources from the U.S. government — these are not allegations, they are official records
ICE's own official Privacy Impact Assessment governing its use of commercial ALPR data. The document requires vendors to maintain audit logs of all queries — and specifies those logs are available to "ICE personnel charged with ensuring proper use." Not to local police departments. Not to cities. Not to residents. This is the document that explains why local police cannot independently verify who has searched their Flock data — only ICE can. Read it yourself at the official DHS website.
View at DHS.govFlock Safety's own patent, filed and granted by the federal government. Describes a system capable of detecting and classifying humans by race, gender, height, weight, and clothing — and explicitly describes querying footage by face recognition data points. Flock publicly states their cameras do not use facial recognition. This patent, in their own words, describes that capability. Searchable at Google Patents.
View at Google PatentsThe U.S. government's official cybersecurity vulnerability registry. Search "Flock Safety" to find 22 confirmed Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) in Flock hardware. These are not allegations — they are formally registered security flaws in the federal database. Some remain unpatched because the underlying operating system (Android 8.1, discontinued 2021) can no longer receive security updates.
Search at NVD.nist.govIndependent technical research into Flock Safety's hardware and software vulnerabilities
The definitive mainstream media account of the Flock security vulnerabilities. Covers Jon Gaines' research showing cameras can be physically compromised in under 30 seconds. Also documents that Flock police login credentials were found for sale on dark web marketplaces, and that Flock did not require multi-factor authentication system-wide. Gaines: "There is a national security risk. This actually needs to be dealt with."
Read at 9NewsTechnical breakdown of researcher Benn Jordan's findings, including that cameras run Android 8.1 — an operating system discontinued in 2021 with no further security patches available, ever. Also covers exposed USB ports, hard-coded Wi-Fi credentials transmitted in cleartext, and unlocked bootloaders allowing anyone with physical access to install arbitrary software.
Read at Privacy GuidesTechnical analysis of the Flock Falcon camera's hardware and software. Documents the unlocked bootloader, debug kernel configuration, "Blue Mode" WiFi access point activated by physical switch sequence (SSID: "flock-54E823", password: "security"), and the use of YOLO object detection running on an outdated Android base. A detailed technical primer on exactly how these cameras work and where they fail.
Read at IPVMDocumented evidence of how federal agencies access local ALPR data — and what that means for border cities
The investigation that broke the story of ICE's "side-door" access to Flock data. ICE agents asked state and local police to run searches on their behalf, giving federal immigration enforcement access to a tool they had no formal contract for. The searches were logged with reasons including "ICE," "immigration," and "deportee." Essential reading for understanding how El Paso's data could be accessed without EPPD's knowledge or authorization.
Read at 404 MediaA Chicago teacher shot five times by a Border Patrol agent. Federal prosecutors sought to block the release of Flock Safety camera footage from her case. A judge ruled against them. This is a documented case of Flock cameras being used in the context of federal immigration enforcement against a U.S. citizen, with the government attempting to suppress that footage. The footage had been tracking her vehicle movements.
Read at Capitol News IllinoisDetailed academic research documenting three pathways federal agencies use to access local Flock data: direct authorized sharing ("front door"), access without explicit local authorization ("back door"), and searches run by authorized users on behalf of agencies without direct access ("side door"). At least ten local agencies had CBP back-door access they had not explicitly authorized. A framework for understanding how El Paso's data could be accessed.
Read the tracking reportThe ACLU of Massachusetts found that Flock's standard agreement with police departments gives the company the right to share data with federal and local agencies for "investigative purposes" — even if a local department chooses to restrict data to its own officers. A department can say no to sharing and still be sharing. This is documented in Flock's own contract language.
Read at ACLU.orgEFF's analysis of how "free" surveillance tools — funded through federal grants — create data pipelines to ICE and other federal agencies that bypass local oversight. Documents ICE agents using a fusion center to query an ALPR network in a self-described sanctuary city. Directly relevant to El Paso, whose Flock deployment was grant-funded.
Read at EFF.orgAlvin ISD in Texas — a 30,000-student district — had its Flock cameras searched 733,000 times in a single month. Thirty law enforcement agencies from other states searched those cameras for immigration purposes. Civil immigration searches outnumbered criminal immigration searches two-to-one. Cops in Tennessee searching school cameras in Texas for undocumented immigrants. This is the system El Paso is participating in.
Read the reportCourt rulings, legal analysis, and civil liberties organization research on ALPR systems
CDT's analysis of what DHS/ICE/PIA-039 actually says about audit logs: "The vendor is required to provide ICE with an audit log of queries to ensure agents abide by policy mandates." Those logs go to ICE — not to local police departments. This is why local police cannot independently verify who has searched their data. A crucial explainer of the document's implications.
Read at CDT.orgComprehensive legal analysis of ALPR systems nationwide. Documents that more than 80 local police departments set up data sharing with ICE without public knowledge. Notes Texas has no state ALPR protection law. Covers Fourth Amendment implications and the Carpenter v. United States ruling on location data. A foundational legal reference.
Read at Brennan Center23-year-old U.S. citizen Ruben Ray Martinez of San Antonio was fatally shot by an HSI agent in South Padre Island. The killing was covered up for months. A Cameron County grand jury issued no indictment. Congressman Joaquin Castro called it an "8-month cover up." While no direct Flock connection has been documented in this case, it illustrates the stakes of federal immigration enforcement access to Texas surveillance data.
Read at Texas TribuneACLU analysis of why audit logs — often cited as the accountability mechanism for Flock — are not a meaningful safeguard. Officers can log vague reasons like "investigation" (used over 1,000 times by one department in one year). There is no mechanism to verify accuracy. The ICE and abortion searches came to light despite audit logs, not because of them. A necessary counterpoint to "we have auditing" assurances.
Read at ACLU.orgResources built by other communities fighting the same fight — adapt them for El Paso
The most comprehensive community toolkit available. Built by one resident who spoke at their city council, got follow-up meetings with the mayor and deputy police chief, and documented everything. Includes deep research reports, a council handout, a 3-minute public comment script, legal analysis, a deputy chief briefing, and a rhetorical strategy guide. All redacted and ready to adapt for El Paso. Licensed CC BY-SA 4.0 — free to use and adapt.
View on GitHubThe Woodland, CA community site that served as a model for DeFlock El Paso. Their Facts page, data audit, and city council coverage show what a well-organized local DeFlock effort looks like in practice. Woodland's situation differs from El Paso's (California has state ALPR protections; Texas does not), but the organizing model is directly applicable.
Visit DeFlock WoodlandA Texas-based DeFlock effort with analysis specifically applicable to Texas communities — including the lack of state ALPR protection law, the patent's facial recognition language, and the history of red light camera battles in Texas as a precedent. Useful for understanding the Texas legal and political landscape.
Visit DeFlock BCSDetailed breakdown of what Flock Safety's patent actually describes versus what the company says publicly. Documents the facial recognition capability language, the person-tracking attributes (race, gender, height, weight, clothing), and how capabilities can be unlocked through a software update once the infrastructure is in place. Texas-focused advocacy.
Visit Texas Privacy CoalitionAn open-source, crowdsourced map of Flock Safety and other ALPR cameras worldwide. Built on OpenStreetMap. If you spot a camera in El Paso, you can report it here and help build a public record of exactly where surveillance infrastructure exists in our city. Your data — and where cameras are placed — should be public knowledge.
View the mapA tool for generating legally accurate public records requests about Flock Safety contracts, with state-specific legal citations. Texas is supported. If you want to file your own records request about El Paso's Flock contract, retention policies, data-sharing arrangements, or audit logs, this toolkit gives you the language to do it correctly.
View on GitHubThe official pages you need to participate in local government
Enter your address to find which of El Paso's eight districts you live in and who represents you. You need this before you can call or email your specific council member.
Find your districtThe official calendar of upcoming City Council meetings, with agendas posted 72 hours in advance. Check here to find the next meeting date and confirm the Flock contract renewal is on the agenda. Sign up to speak at elpasotexas.gov/city-clerk — deadline is 9am the day of the meeting.
View meeting calendarTexas law gives you the right to request public records from the city — including the full Flock Safety contract, audit logs, and data-sharing agreements. Requests must be submitted in writing. Use the city's public information center to file your request. The 30-day data deletion window means time matters.
City Clerk — open records